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FORUM
Supreme Court Decisions
Probably Cause Necessary
For Police To Search
Automobiles
by David Wise
Probable cause for warrantless search of an auto-
mobile for the purpose of capturing contraband, especial-
ly liquor and marijuana, has been the bane of the legal
profession for years. As early as 1925, the Supreme
Court in Carrol V. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925), advises
"The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping the vehicle,
has reasonable or probable cause for believing that con-
traband liquor is being illegally transported in it." Id at
155. The inherent mobility of the car and the possibility
that incriminating evidence might be destroyed were
proffered as reasons for upholding the warrantless vehicle
search, with the proviso that "a seizing officer acts lawful-
ly and at his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause," Id at 156.
The question becomes "what constitutes probable
cause?". A New Jersey court looked at the facts of one
case and affirmed a lower court decision denying a mo-
tion to supress. State V. Williams, 117 N.J.Supr. 372, 285
A.2d 23, (1971). There, an officer who was conducting a
surveillance of an area observed the defendant talking
with a known narcotics offender. Approximately one and
one-half hours later the defendant returned to the area.
The officer began walking over to the defendant's car and
observed the defendant make a downward, furtive mo-
tion throwing a pink package onto the floor. This turned
out to be one hundred fourteen decks of heroin. The
New Jersey court reasoned that probable cause for the
search existed because of the exigent circumstances, the
experience and knowledge of the officer in regard to drug
offenses and the entire transaction when considered in a
common sense, realistic fashion.
The lenient criteria of Williams can be contrasted with
Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875
(1973), where burglary tools and marijuana were seized
as a result of a routine stop and search of an automobile.
The court ruled "since the police officers who stopped a
single automobile in a routine check without any indica-
tion of the improper operation of the vehicle, has no
justification to stop such vehicle ... the stop was constitu-
tionally impermissible and the fruits of the unlawful stop
and seizure should have been suppressed." Id at 879.
Further, the court stated that the automobile was a place
where such instrusions by the police were to be prohi-
bited. The Fourth Amendment protects that vehicle and
its occupants from arbitrary searches and seizures. One
automobile may not be singled out unless there are
enough facts that would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in his belief that the action taken was approp-
riate."
In Delaware v. Prouse, - U.S. , 99 S.Ct.
1391 (1979), the question of justification for police
searches of automobiles was recently examined. There a
patrolman in a police cruiser stopped a car to check the
driver's license and registration and discovered marijuana
on the floor of the car. At a hearing on a motion to
supress the introduction of the marijuana into evidence,
the patrolman admitted that before stopping the vehicle
he had not observed any guidelines concerning stops or
car checks, and he had not seen any suspicious activity
warranting the stop. However, the officer did smell mari-
juana as he approached the car. Would this be enough to
overrule the motion to suppress? After all, "(a)n officer is
entitled to rely on his senses in determining whether
contraband is present ... the officer is not required to
close his eyes or nostrils, walk away, and leave the con-
traband where he sees or smells it." State v. Romonto,
190 Neb.825, 212 N.W. 2d 641, 644 (1973). Nonethe-
less, the trial court and the Delaware Supreme Court
characterized the search as unjustified, and they granted
the motion to supress. Discretionary spot checks by the
police, to preserve public highway safety were balanced
against individual expectations of privacy in an auto-
mobile, with the latter triumphing. The court held that
periodic stops to check such things as license plates,
driver's licenses, and registration were unreasonable, un-
less there was a "reasonable suspicion that a motorist was
unlicensed or that an automobile was not registered, or
that either the vehicle or the occupant was otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of the law," at 1401. The
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that strong justification,
more than mere preservation of public highway safety,
had to be present to allow the police to conduct these
arbitrary spot checks. Privacy must be preserved. Indi-
viduals in a democratic society should not have to live in
constant fear of capricious police searches.
The holding in this case, however, does not preclude
other avenues of police investigation. Checkpoint stops
utilizing roadblocks for the investigation of suspicious
automobiles, roving patrols for policing borders and other
methods of surveillance are now being used to stop the
flow of illegal drugs, cigarettes, liquor, and aliens. Speak-
ing for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist indicated spot
checks are useful tools; productive mechanisms that
promote legitimate state interests, e.g., traffic safety and
public welfare. Rehnquist felt that individual privacy was
counterbalanced by the need to stop the flow of illicit
traffic.
While keeping the requirement of probable cause,
Prouse, supra, has not disallowed all unwarranted vehicle
searches. It has merely addressed one alternative, discre-
tionary spot checks, and left the door open for alterna-
tive, perhaps more insidious methods of surveillance. As
Justice White wrote, "this holding does not preclude the
state of Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that
do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion
... we hold only that persons in automobiles on public
roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel
and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of
police officers." Id at 1401. (Emphasis added)
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Pen Register
Not A "Search"
by T. Scott Basik
On June 20, 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct.
2577 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the installa-
tion and use of a pen register is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A pen register is a
mechanical device, usually installed at a central tele-
phone facility, that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone-it does not register the content of oral com-
munication or even indicate whether the calls made are
completed. Although the Court has consistently held that
the interception of conversations (via wiretaps, bugs, etc.)
is a "search and seizure," it concluded that Fourth
Amendment protection should not be extended to the
numbers dialed on a telephone. This holding was the
result of the following facts: Particia McDonough was
robbed on March 5, 1976, in Baltimore. She gave the
police a description of the robber and of a Monte Carlo
automobile she had observed near the scene of the
crime. After the robbery, McDonough began receiving
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identify-
ing himself as the robber. On March 16, police spotted a
man who fit the description of the robber driving a Monte
Carlo in McDonough's neighborhood. By tracing the
license plate number the police were able to determine
that the car was registered in the name of petitioner,
Michael Smith.
The next day, at the request of the police, the tele-
phone company installed a pen register at its central
offices for the purpose of recording the phone numbers
dialed from Smith telephone. The police failed to obtain a
warrant before having the device installed. The pen regis-
ter revealed that a call was placed from petitioner's home
to McDonough's home. The police then obtained a war-
rant to search the home of Smith. The search revealed
that a page in Smith's phone book was turned down to
the name and number of Patricia McDonough. Smith
was arrested and McDonough identified him in a six-man
line-up.
The Criminal Court of Baltimore City refused to sup-
press the evidence obtained as a result of the use of the
pen register. The petitioner was convicted, and sentenced
to six years imprisonment.
After appealing to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, a writ of certiorari was issued by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in advance of the intermediate
court's decision in order to consider whether the pen
register evidence had been properly admitted at petition-
er's trial. Smith v. State 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858
(1978).
